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VERLEGER positive potential termed P3 (Ritter, Vaughan, & Costa, 1968) or P300 (Donchin & Cohen, 1969) . Usually, the P3 complex is thought to consist of two components (Dien, Spencer, & Donchin, 2004; Gaeta, Friedman, & Hunt, 2003; Polich, 2007; Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975; Verleger, Jaśkowski, & Wauschkuhn, 1994) : of P3a, which is recorded at fronto-central portions of the scalp and is related to attentional processing (Polich, 2007) including distraction of attention from the task at hand (Schröger & Wolff, 1998) , and of P3b which is recorded from parietal portions of the scalp and whose meaning has been a matter of considerable interest and dispute.
Traditionally, there have been two views about the effects of response-related factors on P3b. The mainstream view has maintained that variations of P3b latencies are "independent of response selection and execution" (McCarthy & Donchin, 1981) reflecting factors affecting "stimulus evaluation" only (e.g., Callaway, 1983; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson, 1981 ). An alternative line of theorizing has held that P3b is related to "some aspect of the decision process" about "response set selections" (Hillyard & Kutas, 1983) , that is, about what to do with the current stimulus (cf. Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Hoormann, 1994; Hohnsbein, Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Rösler, Borgstedt, & Sojka, 1985) . The present author first adhered to the mainstream view in this respect (Verleger, 1988) and then, forced by the results of an extensive review on the relationships between P3 latency and response times (Verleger, 1997) changed his mind toward the alternative view. The mainstream view was based on observations made in early, influential studies that the P3 component, measured in single trials, could reach its peak well after the overt response (Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977; Ritter, Simson, & Vaughan, 1972 ). In contrast, when ERPs were time-locked to response times and averaged across trials, some recent studies have found that the peak of P3 occurs on average precisely at the moment of responding (Railo, Revonsuo, & Koivisto, 2015; Saville et al., 2011; Verleger, Jaśkowski, & Wascher, 2005 ; rare stimuli in Verleger, Grauhan, & Śmigasiewicz, 2016a) at least in young participants (Cid-Fernández, Lindín, & Díaz, 2016) . Furthermore, the time-course of P3b's increase from onset to peak closely resembled random-walk processes leading to decisions (Kelly & O'Connell, 2013; O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012; Twomey, Murphy, Kelly, & O'Connell, 2015) .
In favor of the response-related view, it may be noted that there is a flaw in Kutas et al.'s (1977) data: the subset of trials where RTs preceded P3 consisted of trials with incorrect responses. These positive potentials following errors actually might not have been P3s elicited by the stimuli but rather might have been positive components elicited by errors (Pe) (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; . Being unknown in 1977, Pe might have been mistaken for P3. On the contrary, also in recent studies P3 was found to be clearly later than RTs when responding is very fast, as was the case when all (Berchicci, Spinelli, & Russo, 2016) or most (Verleger et al., 2016a) stimuli required the same responses. Verleger et al. (2016a) suggested that frequent responses, primed through the preceding trials, may be performed without resorting to the process reflected by P3b and that the process is needed for implementing rare responses only. This suggestion was confirmed by Walsh, Gunzelmann, and Anderson (2017) . But this issue has certainly not been settled so far.
Therefore, in the present manuscript a new look will be taken at the effects of frequency and relevance which have constituted seemingly evident cornerstones of knowledge on P3(b) since their first publication in the 1960s and 1970s. It will be concluded that a relevant part of those effects is determined by response requirements.
These possibly response-related effects will then be taken to provide a benchmark test of the explanatory power of several hypothetical constructs suggested to be reflected by P3b and hypotheses about the process underlying P3b. The constructs are information, expectancy, and capacity, and the hypotheses include priming, cognitive processing, memory storage, context updating, closure viz. network reset, response facilitation, decision, reactivation of stimulus-response (S-R) links, and making of conscious representations. See Sections 4 and 5 for literature and details. The author is aware that more than those three constructs and nine hypotheses have been suggested, such that this selection is subjectively biased. Nevertheless, it is expected that this comparison will be useful in constraining the set of viable hypotheses about what P3b means in terms of underlying psychological processes.
A difficulty for any such review is the distinction between subcomponents of P3. This difficulty is two-sided, reaching both toward the past and toward the future. Toward the past: P3 had been considered a unitary component until Squires et al. (1975) suggested to distinguish between P3a, P3b, and Slow Wave. Therefore, it might be objected that the classic effects on "P3" to be discussed in this review are not effects on P3b. However, it was precisely Squires et al.'s (1975) point that combined effects of frequency and relevance on "P3" as had been previously reported are actually effects on P3b: These effects were constitutive of P3b. More serious appears the difficulty toward the future: It remains uncertain whether, and to what extent, P3b as described by Squires et al. (1975) is a uniform component. Indeed, several independently varying constituents of P3b, or of the P3 complex, have been described. This has been done by distinguishing variation either (a) between latency ranges or (b) between topographical patterns or (c) between evoking events. Distinction between latency ranges has been widely used, either by means of defining peaks (e.g., "P-SR" and "P-CR" by Falkenstein et al., 1994) or by extracting principal components of time points (PCA with Varimax or Promax rotation) for example, by Squires et al. (1975) and by many others, | 3 of 22 VERLEGER recently systematically by Barry and colleagues, for example, Fogarty, Barry, and Steiner (2019) . Distinction between topographical patterns has been proposed in the 1980s (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986) and has become more wide-spread since the advent of independent component analysis (ICA, e.g., Aasen & Brunner, 2016; Debener, Makeig, Delorme, & Engel, 2005) . Distinction between evoking events has been accomplished by means of residue iteration decomposition which separates the bulk of the P3 component from strictly stimulus-locked and response-locked contributions (e.g., Ouyang, Herzmann, Zhou, & Sommer, 2011; Ouyang, Sommer, & Zhou, 2015; Verleger, Metzner, Ouyang, Śmigasiewicz, & Zhou, 2014) . All those methods have their pros and cons (e.g., Möcks & Verleger, 1986; Ouyang et al., 2015; Scharf & Nestler, 2018) but, as it appears to this author, none has so far been used to make a convincing point that P3b should be redefined in its essence.
| TASK S
To elicit P3b, a task is required: Participants must do something with the presented stimuli. Suitable tasks must have certain characteristics. They must consist of precisely timed short and simple-to-perceive events, otherwise no distinct ERPs will be recorded (though see O'Connell et al., 2012) . These events must be repeated several times, otherwise the ERPs cannot be distinguished from EEG oscillations unrelated to the event. Thus, important characteristics of tasks for measuring the P3b is that these tasks involve sudden-onset, often-repeating events. Starting from 55 years ago, some of the most relevant tasks for measuring P3 and for developing hypotheses about P3b have been the following ones.
| No-go/go task, usually termed oddball task
Two stimuli, one frequent and one rare, are presented in unpredictable random series. The rare stimuli require some response while the frequent stimuli usually require none. P3b components were elicited by the rare stimuli with their rare responses (Squires et al., 1975) , with their amplitudes becoming larger when frequency of the target stimuli decreased (Duncan- Johnson & Donchin, 1977) .
| Prediction task
Two types of stimuli (like flashes and clicks, or single and double clicks) are presented in random series. Participants have to predict the stimulus to come, either verbally (Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965; Sutton, Tueting, Zubin, & John, 1967) or by key-press (Verleger & Cohen, 1978) . Such uncertain stimuli elicited P3s that are larger than when stimulus identity is known in advance. It is in this task that P3 was described for the first time (Sutton et al., 1965) , in parallel to Desmedt, Debecker, and Manil (1965, see below) .
| Signal detection
Weak stimuli are presented at a defined time epoch. Large P3s were elicited by detected signals and not by missed ones (Hillyard, Squires, Bauer, & Lindsay, 1971) . P3s could also be elicited by high-confidence false-alarms, that is, in signalabsent trials when participants were convinced that a signal had occurred (Squires, Hillyard, & Lindsay, 1973) .
| Slow-pace two-channel selection
This task is here mentioned for its historic relevance. Stimuli are presented from two different sources, for example, electric impulses to the skin and sounds. Rare deviant stimuli in one channel have to be detected (Desmedt et al., 1965) or all stimuli in one channel are targets, to be counted (Desmedt & Debecker, 1979a , 1979b . Standard stimuli in the attended channel elicited a P3. This is how P3 was first described by Desmedt et al. (1965; in parallel to Sutton et al., 1965 , who used the prediction task). The major difference from the two-channel auditory paradigm introduced by Hillyard, Hink, Schwent, and Picton (1973) , where standard stimuli in the attended channel did not evoke P3s, seem to be the interstimulus intervals in single channels, amounting to 4 s (Desmedt et al., 1965) and to 5 s (on average or exactly: Desmedt & Debecker, 1979a , 1979b , in contrast to only 0.75 s on average in Hillyard et al.'s (1973) paradigm (cf. below, Section 3.1.1, for the effect of time on P3).
| EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES:

EFFECTS OF FREQUENCY AND RELEVANCE
Frequency and relevance have long been suggested as variables that affect P3b amplitudes. Their effects will be reviewed here, emphasizing the moderating role of response requirements on these effects.
| Frequency
| Frequency in the oddball task
A basic phenomenon of P3b is that its amplitude increases when stimulus frequency decreases (Duncan- Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires et al., 1975;  cf. Section 2.1).
This oddball effect has often been conceived in terms of (subjective) probability (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Johnson, 1986; Kopp et al., 2016; Mars et al., 2008) , separable into global event probability and local probability, the latter being due to expectancies generated by specific preceding stimulus sequences (Squires, Wickens, Squires, & Donchin, 1976) . See Section 4.2 for discussion of the expectancy construct.
An alternative view on the frequency effect is given by the fact that low frequencies of P3-evoking target stimuli, in many cases, come along with larger time intervals between targets. A number of studies attempted at disentangling this confound in the oddball task and demonstrated that the time interval between targets is a strong predictor for P3b amplitude effects, both for targets (Gonsalvez & Polich, 2002; Polich & Bondurant, 1997; Polich & Margala, 1997; Steiner, Barry, & Gonsalvez, 2016) and for non-targets (at least if targets and non-targets are equally frequent: Steiner, Barry, & Gonsalvez, 2014a , 2014b . Moreover, when standard stimuli to be ignored are not presented at all, which transforms the oddball task into a single-stimulus paradigm, P3b amplitudes still get larger with increasing interval from the previous target (Croft, Gonsalvez, Gabriel, & Barry, 2003; Gonsalvez, Barry, Rushby, & Polich, 2007; Steiner, Barry, & Gonsalvez, 2013) , although the few stimuli presented are no longer rare stimuli among frequent distractors. Croft et al.'s (2003) major result is presented in Figure 1 . In fact, P3b amplitudes were equally large in this task as in the usual oddball task in several studies (Cass & Polich, 1997, Exp.2; Croft et al., 2003; Katayama & Polich, 1996; Mertens & Polich, 1997) . Amplitudes were found to be smaller than in the oddball task in some studies, though (Cass & Polich, 1997, Exp.1; Polich & Heine, 1996; Polich, Eischen, & Collins, 1994 , when ISI was 2 s) but were even larger than in the oddball task in another study (Polich et al., 1994 when ISI was 6 s). Thus, it appears that the effect of frequency on P3b should not be conceived of in terms of frequency relative to other stimuli but rather as frequency per time. From a response-related view, all that counts might be the temporal frequency of the stimuli that require the rare (or only) response.
This dependence on frequency is qualified by stimulus relevance. First, as is well known, P3b amplitudes get smaller, or even disappear, when participants are instructed to read a book rather than attending and responding to the stimuli (Squires et al., 1975) . (This is in contrast to Mismatch Negativity which is usually measured when stimuli are ignored, cf. Muller-Gass, Stelmack, & Campbell, 2005) . This effect is even found in the single-stimulus paradigm where | 5 of 22 VERLEGER the single, isolated stimuli are more intrusive (Mertens & Polich, 1997) . Thus, obviously there is a modulation of the effect of frequency on P3 by stimulus relevance. (cf. Johnson, 1986 , for a different view). This modulation might reflect an interaction of stimulus frequency and stimulus relevance. Alternatively, it may simply be a main effect of response frequency: Large P3s will be elicited by stimuli that require rare responses, while stimulus frequency per se does not matter. For example, in two tasks where participants had to respond to female names, P3 components became delayed but did not appreciably differ in amplitudes between a condition when the oddball targets varied across trials among 20 female names (and standards among 20 male names) and a condition when the target was a constant "Nancy" (vs. a frequent "David") although each of the 20 names was much less frequent than the constant "Nancy" (Kutas et al., 1977) . Nor differed P3 amplitudes between a condition when a rare tone (33% frequency) to be counted was interspersed among frequent standard tones (67%), as usual, and a condition where there were three equiprobable tones of 33%, one of which had to be counted (Johnson & Donchin, 1980) . This result is depicted in Figure 2 , left side. Results virtually identical to Kutas et al. (1977) and Johnson and Donchin (1980) were reported with letters as stimuli in two experiments by Courchesne, Hillyard, and Courchesne (1977) Results from their Experiment 2 are depicted in Figure 2 , right side.
Traditionally, this feature has been conceived of in terms of "categorization" which is not wrong. But, it may be noted that such categories are defined by the responses assigned to the stimuli: The reason that 20 female names form the same category as one female name is because participants were instructed to respond in the same way to those 20 names as to the one name, and the reason that two of three equiprobable tones form the same non-target category as one frequent tone is that all these tones are identical in not requiring any response. Thus, it may be suspected that response frequency is indeed causal in evoking P3. But this does not seem to be true because when response cues get dissolved by fractions of a second from the stimuli, P3s are still elicited by the rare targets (though with reduced amplitudes) rather than by the cues for the rare response Verleger, Siller, Ouyang, & Śmigasiewicz, 2017) . Thus, the most appropriate conclusion seems to be that frequency, the powerful determinant of P3b amplitude in the oddball task, actually is frequency of the R-defined S category relative to time.
| Frequency in the prediction task
An obvious question in the prediction task has been whether P3 is larger with correctly or with incorrectly predicted F I G U R E 2 Effects of using various versus constant stimuli. Left side: Grand means ERPs (n = 8) at Cz for target stimuli (to be counted: solid line) and non-targets (dashed line). One-third of all stimuli (in random order) were targets (1,000 Hz tones), two-thirds were non-targets: either always 1,400 Hz (upper graph) or either 1,400 Hz or 1,800 Hz randomly mixed (lower graph). Waveforms, x axis, and y axis calibration scale were cut and copied from Figures 2 and 3 of Johnson and Donchin (1980) , reprinted with the permission from John Wiley and Sons®. Right side: Individual ERPs from Pz of the three participants. Single letters were presented at intervals of 1.2 s. 80% of all stimuli were the letter A, 10% were the letter B (thin dotted lines), and 10% were (in different blocks) either the letters C-Z in random order (bold solid lines), or the numbers 0-23 in random order (thin solid lines). In different blocks, either the B was a target to be counted, and the many letters/numbers were non-targets, or vice versa. This is Figure 4 from Courchesne et al. (1977) , reprinted with the permission from John Wiley and Sons®. Positive voltage is plotted upward stimuli. Sutton et al. (1965) reported larger amplitudes of the predicted stimuli after incorrect guesses, but Levit, Sutton, and Zubin (1973) reported larger amplitudes after correct guesses, and Verleger and Cohen (1978) and Kotchoubey, Grözinger, Kornhuber, and Kornhuber (1997) did not find any reliable difference.
This variability might be due to varying event frequencies, as already conjectured by Sutton et al. (1965;  referring to data later published by Tueting, Sutton, & Zubin, 1970) . This issue was reconsidered in recent studies in this author's lab (Verleger, Asanowicz, Werner, & Śmigasiewicz, 2015; Verleger, Cäsar, Siller, & Śmigasiewicz, 2017; Verleger & Śmigasiewicz, 2016) where the two stimuli to be predicted had frequencies of 80% and 20%. Participants adapted their prediction frequencies to these stimulus frequencies, making about 80% frequent and 20% rare predictions, such that frequent stimuli matching the prediction occurred in about 64% of trials, non-matching frequent stimuli in 16%, non-matching rare stimuli in 16%, and matching rare stimuli in 4%. In line with these outcome probabilities, P3b amplitudes elicited by frequent stimuli were consistently larger after incorrect guesses (16%) than after correct ones (64%). The opposite result was to be expected for rare stimuli where correct guesses were less probable than incorrect ones (4% vs. 16%). However, this latter result was not significant in each of the four studies reported in those three papers. This variability between studies might well be due to noise, which is by necessity large with events that occur in about 4% of trials only. Therefore, here, data were combined from those four studies in an overall ANOVA on mean amplitudes at 300-500 ms recorded from CPz: 16 participants from Exp.1 of , 16 participants from Exp.2 of that paper, 20 participants from Verleger and Śmigasiewicz (2016) , and 16 participants from Verleger, Cäsar, et al. (2017) . Data were averaged over any different versions of the prediction task in each experiment. The grand means over these 68 participants are displayed in Figure 3 . As may be seen in this figure, larger P3 amplitudes were not only elicited by incorrectly predicted frequent stimuli compared to correctly predicted ones (F 1,64 = 183.8, p < .001), but also by correctly predicted rare stimuli compared to incorrectly predicted ones (F 1,64 = 16.4, p < .001). Taken together, these results provide further evidence that effects of frequency on P3 have little to do with stimulus frequency per se. Rather, one and the same stimulus elicits a larger or smaller P3 depending on frequency of the outcome that the stimulus is right or F I G U R E 3 Effects of outcome frequency in the prediction task. Grand averages of ERPs evoked by stimuli to be predicted ("outcomes"), recorded from CPz. The prediction task is outlined on the left. Frequencies of X and U alternated between participants, either 80%/20% or 20%/80%. Waveforms are displayed in each for the four outcomes: correctly predicted frequent stimuli (thin grey), incorrectly predicted frequent stimuli (bold grey), incorrectly predicted rare stimuli (thin black), and correctly predicted rare stimuli (bold black). Data were pooled over 68 participants of four studies reported in , Verleger and Śmigasiewicz (2016) , and Verleger, Cäsar, et al. (2017) . Note that frequent and rare stimuli occur in 80% and 20% of trials and participants' predictions approximated these probabilities. Thereby, incorrect predictions were less frequent than correct predictions with frequent stimuli, and correct predictions were less frequent than incorrect predictions with rare stimuli. It were these outcome frequencies that mainly determined P3 amplitudes. Note that there were minor differences among the four pooled studies. Outcomes had to be confirmed by another key-press in Verleger, Cäsar, et al. (2017) study and in one condition of Verleger and Śmigasiewicz (2016) . Outcomes had different colors when correctly and when incorrectly predicted In Exp.1 of and in one condition of Exp.2 of that study | 7 of 22 VERLEGER wrong predicted. The direction of the prediction effect (larger or smaller P3 with correct predictions) depends on frequency of these outcomes rather than on success of prediction. In fact, highly similar results were obtained when the prediction task was changed to a matching task, replacing participants' frequent and rare key-presses, which indicated their predictions, by frequent and rare S1 stimuli with which the following stimulus, as S2, had to be compared (Verleger, Cäsar, et al., 2017) : Frequent S2 elicited smaller P3s after frequent than after rare S1. Rare S2 elicited the largest P3s after rare S1 (i.e., the identical stimulus) and somewhat smaller P3s after frequent S1. Thus, these results suggest that what matters is outcome frequency, rather than stimulus frequency and rather than confirmation or disconfirmation of predictions.
| Frequency in the signal detection task
Briefly after Hillyard et al. (1971) had published their results of P3s elicited in the signal detection task, Paul and Sutton (1972) used this paradigm for assessing variations of hit frequencies. In one part of the experiment, frequencies of trials with versus without signals were varied between blocks. As could be expected, larger P3s were elicited when signals were less frequent (Figure 4 , left side). In the other part of their experiment, signals and non-signals were equiprobable but participants' response criteria were changed between blocks by either providing greater rewards for rating signal presence than absence ("liberal") or by scoring everything equally ("unbiased") or by providing greater reward for rating signal absence than presence ("conservative"), see Figure  4 for details. Thereby, in spite of equal stimulus frequencies, hit frequencies per block mimicked variations of objective signal frequency, being frequent in the liberal condition and rare in the conservative one. Correspondingly, P3s elicited by detected signals were smallest in the liberal condition and largest in the conservative one ( Figure 4 , right side). The simplest explanation of these findings is that P3 elicited by detected signals is affected by frequency of hits. "Hits" is an "R-defined S category" just like in the instances of the oddball task discussed in Section 3.1.1, that is, it is again response frequency that matters. Yet, Paul and Sutton (1972) accounted for their findings exclusively in terms of stimulus parameters and hypothesized that what might have been varied in their experiment was an ad-hoc introduced hypothetical construct called "stimulus salience." This was an unfortunate step backward from Hillyard et al.'s (1971) view that P3 is related to participants' decisions.
As noted by one reviewer of this manuscript, one reason for Paul and Sutton (1972) attributing this possibly response-mediated effect to pure stimulus characteristics might have been that P3 was being seen as a unitary component at that time. In this vein, Paul and Sutton (1972) might have aimed at reaching a unifying concept that would encompass P3's sensitivity to task characteristics as diverse as the attention-catching quality of stimuli, their associations F I G U R E 4 Effects of hit frequency, rather than signal frequency, on P3 evoked by detected signals. The middle part of this figure is Figure   1 from Paul and Sutton (1972) , reprinted with the permission from The American Association for the Advancement of Science, showing four participants' individual average ERPs elicited by detected signals ("hits"), recorded from Cz. Signal probability was varied between blocks in Experiment A from frequent to rare (left column). Cautious, neutral, or liberal decision criteria were induced in different blocks of Experiment B while signal probability was constant at 50% (right column). Signals were short clicks in the middle of 2 s white-noise intervals to responses, and their novelty. However, each of these aspects would shortly later be attributed by Hillyard's group to different P3-type components, namely P3a, P3b (Squires et al., 1975) , and novelty P3 (Courchesne, Hillyard, & Galambos, 1975) . Thereby, there was no need any more for all-encompassing concepts of "P3" covering aspects of P3a, P3b, and novelty P3.
The P3a and novelty-P3 group of components, with its centro-frontal maximum on the scalp, was later completed to include no-go P3 (Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985) . It has been suggested that these non-P3b components, at least P3a and novelty P3, are actually one and the same component (e.g., Dien et al., 2004; Polich, 2007; Simons, Graham, Miles, & Chen, 2001 ) but this issue remains controversial (Barry, Steiner, & De Blasio, 2016) and is beyond the scope of the present article which focuses on P3b.
| Relevance
| Relevance in the oddball task
As noted in Section 3.1.1, it is well known since Squires et al. (1975) that no P3b is elicited when participants are instructed to ignore (auditory) stimuli by reading a book, and that, likewise, P3b is distinctly reduced when participants just perceive stimuli without having to respond in any way (Mertens & Polich, 1997) . Data from Squires et al.'s (1975) study are displayed in Figure 5 .
It appears that these variations of task relevance are related to variations of response requirements. However, Johnson (1986) in his influential taxonomy avoided mentioning the importance of responses for stimulus relevance altogether. He chose the term "stimulus meaning" as an overarching term, comprising "task complexity," "stimulus complexity," and "stimulus value" (p.370), which were assumed to have in common that "stimuli are processed to a greater or lesser extent depending on the complexity of the situation" (p.371). The increase of P3b from ignoring the stimuli, via perceiving the stimuli without responding, to responding to the stimuli would be subsumed in this taxonomy under "task complexity": P3b is said to increase when the task becomes more complex. There are two problems with this conception. First, as convincingly argued by Kok (2001) , task complexity, requiring capacity allocation, confounds two separate task variables "namely task difficulty and task emphasis" which "have opposite effects on the amplitude of P3" (p.557), with P3 amplitudes being increased by task emphasis (as in the variation discussed here) but being reduced (rather than increased as implied by Johnson, 1986 ) by task difficulty. Second, neither Johnson (1986) nor Kok (2001) relate relevance (viz. task complexity or task difficulty or task emphasis) to differences between tasks in response requirements although such differences are obvious: the blind spot of P3 research.
In a series of experiments, this author studied the effects of response instructions on the oddball effect on P3b, by delaying responses, by making responses difficult, and by removing information about S-R mappings. Delaying responses by splitting the target stimuli into the stimulus proper and a go signal reduced the stimulus-elicited oddball effect on P3. This was even true when go signals were separated from the stimuli by 100 ms only . The oddball effect seemed completely eliminated when responses to the rare stimuli were made difficult by requiring participants to combine features from two simultaneously presented dimensions for selecting the response: P3b elicited by the rare stimuli seemed to be altogether abolished (Verleger, Baur, Metzner, & Śmigasiewicz, 2014) . However, splitting the presentations of the two dimensions in time showed that P3b proper elicited by the rare first feature was only reduced but not eliminated. Its disappearance with simultaneous presentation of the two dimensions was probably due to overlap with a fronto-central negative component reflecting controlled response selection (Verleger, Baur, et al., 2014) . The mechanism common to those studies appeared to be that the oddball effect became reduced when any information relevant for responding was to be delivered later (Verleger, Grauhan, & Śmigasiewicz, 2016b; Verleger, Hamann, Asanowicz, & Śmigasiewicz, 2015; Verleger, Keppeler, Sassenhagen, & Śmigasiewicz, 2018) attesting to the significance of response-related factors on P3b. Sutton et al.'s (1965) major finding is that P3s were larger when identities of the eliciting stimuli were not known in advance than they were known may be cast in terms of increased relevance of the stimuli in the former case. From a response-related perspective, it may be suggested that an internal response is made in the uncertain condition ("right"/"wrong," i.e., stimulus "matches"/"mismatches" the prediction; Verleger, Cäsar, et al., 2017) but not in the certain condition.
| Relevance in the prediction task
| Summary
In discussing effects of frequency and relevance on P3b in classic tasks used to elicit P3b ("oddball" = no-go/go, prediction, signal detection) five potentially response-related effects were | 9 of 22 VERLEGER highlighted which are illustrated in Figures 1-5 and form the first five columns of Table 1 : (1) The oddball effect is mainly an effect of temporal infrequency. (2) The effect of stimulus infrequency is actually an effect of response-defined stimulus infrequency.
(3) With stimuli to be predicted, the effect of frequency manifests as effect of frequency of outcomes (i.e., the specific combinations of prediction and stimulus) rather than of frequency of stimuli. (4) In signal detection, P3b is determined by frequency of hits rather than by frequency of signals.
(5) The oddball effect is substantially increased when there is a task associated with the stimuli. The following discussion of constructs and hypotheses about P3b will focus on their abilities in accounting for these effects.
| CONSTRUCTS
It will now be discussed how the constructs of information, expectancy, and capacity that have been associated with P3b can deal with the potentially response-related effects illustrated in Figures 1-5 and compiled in Table 1 . Additionally, their way of accounting for the oddball effect will be highlighted.
F I G U R E 5 Effects of relevance on
P3b. Average ERPs recorded from Cz in six participants of Squires et al.'s (1975) Experiment 1, copied from their Figure  2 , with the permission from Elsevier®. Loud (90 dB) and soft (70 dB) tones were presented in random order, with probabilities of 0.1/0.9, 0.5/0.5, 0.9/0.1 in different blocks. In ignore blocks, participants read a book. In attend blocks, one of the two tones had to be counted (in different blocks either the loud or the soft one). "a" and "b" denotes Squires et al.'s classification for P3a and P3b (which two subcomponents were reported in this article for the first time). P3b was increased with rare stimuli to be counted. Positive polarity is plotted upward T A B L E 1 Performance of several constructs and hypotheses in accounting for effects on P3b "+" is entered for results compatible with a given construct or hypothesis, "0" means that no accurate account for the result free of contradictions is provided, and "−" means that the result was opposite to what the construct or hypothesis implies. | 11 of 22 VERLEGER 4.1 | Information Sutton et al. (1967) had considered P3 a correlate of delivery of information by the stimulus. This notion fitted their finding from 1965 that P3s are elicited when it was not clear from beforehand that some particular stimulus would be presented, such that this stimulus provided new information.
Oddball effect: According to this notion, rare stimuli elicit larger P3b amplitudes because they deliver more information than frequent ones. This makes sense if it is assumed that participants tend to expect the frequent stimulus: It is only in this case that rare stimuli provide more information. However, if this is true, why is P3 not generally larger after incorrect predictions (where stimuli are unexpected and, therefore, deliver more information) than after correct predictions? Therefore, a 0 is entered in the respective cell of Table 1. The expectancy concept will be more thoroughly discussed below.
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency (first column of Table 1 ): This effect may be covered by the information construct when additionally assuming that information provided by the preceding stimulus underlies some decay in time ("+").
R-defined S categories (second column of Table 1 ): The information construct does not distinguish between response-relevant and other information. Thus, P3b is expected to be smaller with an ever-repeating rare "Nancy" than with the varying names "Betty," "Debby" etc., which provide new information at each occurrence. Yet, this is not the case ("−").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks (third column of Table 1 ). The information construct may account for the significance of outcome infrequency over stimulus infrequency by assuming (Tueting et al., 1970 ) that the information provided by the stimuli is a function of the conditional probabilities of the stimuli given participants' prediction: Having guessed the frequent stimulus, it is improbable that this guess will be wrong and, likewise, having guessed the rare stimulus, it is improbable that this guess will be right, so both these improbable events provide more information and will elicit large P3s. However, it remains unclear why relatively large P3s are elicited by frequent stimuli after "rare" guesses: After all, this is still the probable case, both absolutely and given a "rare" guess ("0").
Hit frequency (fourth column of Table 1 ): It likewise appears plausible at first sight that identified signals ("hits") provide more information than just any signals. Thus, P3's sensitivity to hit frequency in Paul and Sutton's (1972) study appears to fit the information framework. However, what was varied in that study was not the amount of objectively delivered information, affecting sensitivity to the signal, but rather participants' criteria of reporting signal presence, making the amount of delivered information a variable of secondary importance ("0").
Relevance (fifth column of Table 1 ): It can be simply assumed that stimulus information is processed by participants only if the stimuli are relevant to some extent ("+").
| Expectancy
Oddball effect: As noted in Section 3.1.1, the oddball effect has often been conceived in terms of (subjective) probability, with expectancies assumed to be generated by specific preceding stimulus sequences, leading to some stimuli being unexpected and, thereby, evoking larger P3b amplitudes. To detail, this conception includes three assumptions: (a) rare stimuli are unexpected, (b) P3b is increased when stimuli are unexpected, and (c) this increase of P3b by unexpectedness is causal for the increase of P3b with rare stimuli. In line with assumption (a) are hundreds of studies showing that behavioral responses are slower with rare stimuli than with frequent ones (e.g., Miller, 1998) . In line with assumption (b), larger P3s were elicited by unpredicted than predicted stimuli when participants made explicit predictions about which of two equiprobable stimuli would be presented (Matt, Leuthold, & Sommer, 1992; Munson, Ruchkin, Ritter, Sutton, & Squires, 1984; Sutton et al., 1965; cf. Ritter, Sussman, Deacon, Cowan, & Vaughan, 1999) . However, these effects were neither large, nor did they provide evidence on assumption (c) because the two alternative stimuli to be predicted were equally frequent rather than frequent and rare.
Indeed, all three assumptions can be contested. With regard to assumption (a), it has been argued that rare stimuli are simultaneously unexpected and expected: Unexpected due to their low probability of occurrence but "awaited" due to their relevance, being regarded by participants and experimenters as the stimuli which the task is about (Bouret & Sara, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Verleger, 1988) . With regard to assumption (b), as was mentioned in Section 3.1.2, Sutton et al.'s (1965) report of increased amplitudes with unpredicted stimuli was not replicated (Kotchoubey et al., 1997; Levit et al., 1973; Verleger & Cohen, 1978) . Furthermore, P3b amplitudes were equally large for stimuli expected at some time-point as for unexpectedly timed stimuli (Fogelson, Shah, Bonnet-Brilhault, & Knight, 2010; Fogelson et al., 2009; Miniussi, Wilding, Coull, & Nobre, 1999; Verleger et al., 1994) . With regard to assumption (c), a series of studies by Sommer and colleagues compared effects of explicit subjective expectancies about the next stimulus with effects of preceding objective sequences of alternating or repeating stimuli (Matt et al., 1992; Sommer, Leuthold, & Soetens, 1999; Sommer, Matt, & Leuthold, 1990 ) and found that P3 amplitudes were more affected by objective sequences than by explicit expectancies (Sommer, Leuthold, & Matt, 1998) . In the same vein, Verleger & Śmigasiewicz (2016) observed that rare stimuli to be predicted elicited much larger P3s than frequent stimuli, largely irrespectively of whether the rare stimuli were or were not predicted (likewise Verleger, Cäsar, et al., 2017) . Thus, the available evidence does neither support the notion that P3b is increased when stimuli are unexpected, nor the more far-reaching notion that the increase of P3b with rare stimuli is due to these stimuli being unexpected. Rather, the effect of frequency on P3b amplitude seems to be largely independent of expectancies, yielding a "0" entry in the oddball column of Table 1 .
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: It is plausible to assume that targets, when being the only stimuli presented, are more expected when intervals from preceding stimuli get longer. Indeed, response times get shorter when intervals increase above 5 s (Steiner et al., 2013) . Therefore, according to the notion that P3 is large for unexpected stimuli, P3b amplitudes are supposed to get smaller with longer intervals. However, P3b amplitudes get larger in this case ("−" in column 1).
R-defined S categories: In accordance with the expectancy construct, it might be argued that it is the unexpected response that affects P3b rather than the unexpected stimulus. But this was certainly not implied in the original notion of the expectancy concept ("0" in column 2).
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Expectancies might well refer to prediction-outcome combinations rather than to isolated stimuli ("+" in column 3).
Hit frequency: P3b's increase to identified signals when participants change their criterion to have fewer hits would imply that participants expect less signals when they change their criterion, which seems far-fetched ("0" in column 4).
Relevance: It may be assumed that expectancies may develop only if the stimuli are relevant to some extent ("+" in column 5).
| Capacity of processing
P3b has been used as a measure of spare capacity in dual-task situations. In such studies, participants performed an oddball task (or another simple P3b-evoking task) while simultaneously dealing with another task. The difference of targetelicited P3b amplitudes between the oddball task performed alone and its use as a "secondary" task has been considered a measure of the processing capacity required by, viz. of the resources allocated to, the other task (Hoffman, Houck, MacMillan, Simons, & Oatman, 1985; Isreal, Chesney, Wickens, & Donchin, 1980; Strayer & Kramer, 1990; Wickens, Kramer, Vanasse, & Donchin, 1983) .
A major problem with this conception of capacities and resources has been its ambiguity (Navon, 1984) : Does some task attract more capacity because it is hard to solve or, just on the contrary, because it is easy to solve and, therefore, preferentially processed? This is one of the reasons why the capacity approach to multitasking has been replaced in general psychology by analyses about what are the relevant processing steps that act as bottlenecks where two tasks interfere with each other (De Jong, 1993; Pashler, 1994) . Correspondingly, the use of P3b amplitude as a measure of processing capacity has been found to be ambiguous because, as summarized by Kok (2001; cf. above, 3. 2.1), P3b amplitudes increase when some task attains more relevance ("task emphasis" in Kok's terms) and decrease when some task increases in difficulty ("task difficulty") while the capacity concept implies that more capacity is invested in either case.
Applying the capacity notion to the benchmark results compiled in Table 1 yields mixed results.
Oddball effect: Rare targets elicit larger P3b amplitudes than frequent stimuli because target processing requires more capacity. Apart from the noted problems of the capacity concept, this seems to make sense ("+").
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: When targets are the only stimuli presented, their processing is expected to require less capacity than when they must be discriminated from standard stimuli. Thus, P3b amplitudes should be smaller in the one-stimulus tasks than in oddball tasks. As reported in Section 3.1.1, this has not been unambiguously found ("0").
R-defined S categories: When different stimuli have to be processed, more capacity is expected to be invested than when there is only one target and one non-target. Yet, P3 amplitudes do not differ between these situations ("−").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Without making additional assumptions, the capacity notion cannot account for the finding that outcome infrequency affects P3 in prediction tasks more than pure stimulus infrequency ("0").
Hit frequency: P3b's increase to identified signals when participants change their criterion to have fewer hits does not appear to be related to processing capacity ("0").
Relevance: More capacity will be invested when stimuli are relevant ("+").
| HYPOTHESES
The constructs information, expectancy, and capacity did not imply explicit assumptions about the process underlying P3b. In contrast, what is going to be called hypotheses in this section will imply such assumptions to a greater or lesser degree. These hypotheses about the process | 13 of 22 VERLEGER underlying P3b will likewise be applied to the results compiled in Table 1 . Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggested that P3 reflects violations of automatic passive primed dispositions about what to perceive rather than of active conscious expectancies.
| Priming
Oddball effect: Because, it may be assumed that perception of the frequent stimuli is primed by their immediately preceding occurrence, this notion can well account for P3b's elicitation by rare stimuli ("+").
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: Likewise, this notion can easily account for the increase of P3 after longer intervals without stimuli, provided the priming of the presented stimulus decays over time after its previous presentation (possibly akin to Gonsalvez et al.'s, 1999 , template-updating hypothesis) ("+").
R-defined S categories: Passive priming of perceptual processing predicts that P3b will be affected by using ever-varying stimuli. This is not the case ("−").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Perceptual priming may account for the results (third column) that P3 increases massively with rare stimuli to be predicted and moderately with frequent stimuli after a "rare" prediction. The former result would occur because processing of frequent stimuli is primed due to their frequency, irrespective of what was overtly predicted. The second result would occur because the rare prediction might have simultaneously primed some processing of the rare stimulus ("+").
Hit frequency: The increase of P3b when participants change their criterion to have fewer hits cannot be explained by passive priming of perceptual processing ("−").
Relevance: Similarly, the moderating effect of relevance cannot be conceived in terms of a passive, automatic process ("−").
| Cognitive processing
There is the wide-spread notion that P3b is "the cognitive component," possibly deriving from Ritter and Vaughan (1969) who suggested that the "late positive complex" (i.e., the P3) is "a correlate of central processes for cognitive evaluation of stimulus significance" (p. 328). Ritter and Vaughan's (1969) view was based on published and unpublished observations reported in that paper, not least the observation that P3s increased with both targets and non-targets, rather than occurring with targets only, when the target/non-target discrimination was made hard. However, this finding was not mentioned any more in the authors' following actual publications about hard versus easy discriminations (e.g., Ritter et al., 1972; Ritter, Simson, Vaughan, & Friedman, 1979) and was clearly not obtained in the elaborate study by Novak, Ritter, Vaughan, and Wiznitzer (1990) .
Oddball effect: Thus, it is assumed that P3b is evoked by rare stimuli because rare stimuli are harder to process than frequent stimuli. This assumption has some face validity ("+").
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: When non-target stimuli are replaced by empty stimulation it is plausible to assume that the remaining one type of stimuli requires less cognitive processing than when having to be discriminated from standard stimuli. Thus, P3b amplitudes should be smaller in the one-stimulus tasks than in oddball tasks. As reported in Section 3.1.1, this has not been unambiguously found, yielding a "0" entry.
R-defined S categories: When several stimuli have to be categorized for selecting the response, cognitive processing is required to a greater extent than when there is only one target and one non-target. Yet, P3 amplitudes do not differ between these situations ("−").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Cognitive processing is a term vague enough to account for the finding that outcome infrequency affects P3 in prediction tasks more than pure stimulus infrequency ("+").
Hit frequency: P3b's increase to identified signals when participants change their criterion to have fewer hits cannot be well conceived in terms of increased cognitive processing ("0").
Relevance: Cognitive processing will take place more if the stimuli are relevant to some extent ("+").
| Memory storage
Several authors have related the P3 component to storage in working memory (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1986 Karis, Fabiani, & Donchin, 1984; Polich, Howard, & Starr, 1983; Steiner et al., 2013; Walhovd & Fjell, 2003) such that in his influential review Polich (2007) suggested that P3b reflects memory storage.
Oddball effect: The oddball effect is quite simply explained by this hypothesis in assuming that rare stimuli must be stored to memory to be identified later again (e.g., Klein, Coles, & Donchin, 1984) . This makes sense at first sight ("+" in Table 1 ) though there may be problems at second sight (cf. Verleger's, 1988 , criticism at the "Update" version of context updating-hypothesis).
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: It is reasonable to assume that memory storage is required to a greater extent when the relevant stimulus has to be distinguished from other stimuli, to be better identified in the future. Therefore, memory storage is required more in the usual oddball task than in the single-stimulus task, and so P3b amplitudes should be larger in the oddball task. Yet, evidence is somewhat equivocal in this respect, as reported in Section 3.1.1 ("0").
R-defined S categories: Evidently, memory storage will be required more when a new stimulus is encountered in each trial than when always the same two well-known stimuli are presented. Therefore, P3b should be larger in the former case than in the latter. Yet, this is not the actual result ("−").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Infrequent outcomes might be considered particularly relevant events to be stored in memory, thus the memory storage notion does not have difficulties in accounting for the larger effects of outcome infrequency than of pure stimulus infrequency in prediction tasks ("+").
Hit frequency: When identified signals become rare, they will have to be more intensively stored to memory than when they are frequent ("+").
Relevance: Memory plausibly is biased to prefer relevant events ("+").
Since the memory storage hypothesis is so wide-spread (e.g., Polich, 2007 Polich, , 2012 Steiner et al., 2013) a few critical comments may be in order, complementing the neuropsychological and psychological arguments put forward earlier (Verleger, 2008) . Even though the first papers promoting the memory notion (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1986; Karis et al., 1984) provided evidence that words later were better recalled when larger P300 amplitudes were elicited, this effect was quite small with standard presentation of stimuli, where it became significant in latency-adjusted averages only (Fabiani et al., 1986) . It became distinct only when P3 amplitudes were increased by an additional manipulation: ERPs were analyzed with words that possessed some salient irrelevant feature like deviating font size (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Karis et al., 1984) . In retrospect (cf. discussion in Section 3.1.3.) this appears to be an effect on novelty P3 rather than on P3b. This conjecture corresponds to Karis et al.'s (1984, p.177 ) and Fabiani et al.'s (1990, p.22 ) global definition of "P300" as being associated not only to "task-relevant" but also to "novel, task-relevant" stimuli. This non-specificity of the memory effect to P3b was corroborated by findings that attributed the memory difference to other components, as to P250 (Chapman, McCrary, & Chapman, 1978) and, more generally, to "Dm" (difference due to memory), which often could be characterized as a broad, late positivity that differed from P3b in its sensitivity to experimental factors, its time-course, and its scalp distribution (Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 2001; Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 1987; Sommer, Schweinberger, & Matt, 1991) . Thus, a relationship between P3b and memory could not be proven by those early studies.
Interindividual relationships between P3b parameters and memory have been reported. For example, people with longer P3b latencies in an oddball task were found to have smaller memory spans for digits (Polich et al., 1983; Walhovd & Fjell, 2003) . Yet again, this relationship was not specific to P3b, being less marked for P3b than for P3a (Polich et al., 1983) . More specific to P3b was Steiner et al.'s (2013) finding that it was particularly in participants with good working memory that parietal P3b amplitudes became larger with increasing intervals between stimuli (measured separately for targets and non-targets). In turn, recent experiments comparing P3b amplitudes between stimuli that did or did not require memory updating showed that the requirement of memory updating did not systematically affect P3b amplitudes (Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2016 . Thus, evidence on the memory storage hypothesis is still not unambiguously convincing.
| Context updating
According to Donchin (1981) , P3 reflects context updating, meaning that some "model of the environment" (Donchin & Coles, 1988) is updated "when there is a conflict between new information and expectations derived from a 'schema'" (Kamp, Brumback, & Donchin, 2013) . This schema is assumed to be involved in the metacontrol setting of priorities, biases, and probabilities (Donchin & Coles, 1988) , and is, thus, not identical to working memory for single items discussed in the previous section.
Oddball effect: It is not clear how the hypothesis accounts for the simple oddball effect: When properly updated, any adequate "model of the environment" will certainly allow for the occurrence of both frequent and rare stimuli, so why should the schema be more updated when encountering a rare stimulus than when encountering a frequent one? Both stimuli will have been part of the model, or won't they? Is the schema not able to form a model that allows for two stimuli being presented, a frequent and a rare one? If not, what is the difference between such one-stimulus model "of the environment" and the process reflected by mismatch negativity (which has likewise been described as updating of predictive models about auditory regularities: Winkler, 2007) : What would then P3b be for? Thus, a "0" is entered in Table 1 .
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: Strategic readjustment may be more required when situations are more complex: P3b is expected to be larger in the usual oddball task, where there are two different stimuli, than in the one-stimulus task. However, as reported in Section 3.1.1 and noted in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, evidence is ambiguous ("0").
R-defined S categories: Context updating is flexible enough to deal with the importance of category, thereby accounting for equivalence of perceiving diverse stimuli compared with always perceiving the same two stimuli ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: Context updating easily explains why outcome infrequency affects | 15 of 22 VERLEGER P3b more than pure stimulus infrequency, owing to readjusting prediction strategies (Munson et al., 1984) yielding a "+".
Hit frequency: It is not clear why the model of the environment needs more revising particularly with high-confidence hits ("0").
Relevance: As a matter of course, strategic readjustments are more required when stimuli are more relevant ("+").
| Closure of cognitive epochs
According to Desmedt and Debecker (1979a) P3 reflects the closure of cognitive epochs once decisions on relevant signals have been reached, resetting the brain's processing system (cf. Bouret & Sara, 2005) .
Oddball effect: P3 will be the larger, the longer some cognitive epoch had lasted and the more relevant the signal is, which well applies to "awaited" rare targets ("+" ; Verleger, 1988) . 1 Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: Since epoch length and stimulus relevance are the critical features for increasing P3b, the closure hypothesis considers target stimuli equivalent in the single-stimulus and oddball paradigms ("+").
R-defined S categories: The concept of cognitive epochs is abstract enough to predict no difference between the oddball task with varying names compared to constant names ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: While closure can easily explain the general phenomenon why predicted stimuli (by ending the cognitive epoch in a given trial) elicit larger P3b amplitudes than stimuli known in advance, the fact that rare outcomes in the prediction task elicit particularly large amplitudes provides a complex challenge: It has to be assumed that the cognitive epoch spanning the trial duration from prediction to predicted event is embedded in a larger cognitive epoch lasting from one rare outcome to the next, which appears overcomplex ("0").
Hit frequency: Hits, rather than any signals, elicit large P3s because it is only when the awaited event has occurred and is successfully processed that the epoch will be closed ("+").
Relevance: It may be assumed, similarly to the hypothesis of cognitive processing (Section 5.2), that cognitive epochs are established by participants only when stimuli are relevant ("+").
From the response-related viewpoint, it may be conjectured that the reason why the closure hypothesis fares so well in accounting for these results is that the act of closing the epoch is conceived as a response exerted by participants rather than some response-independent feature of the stimuli.
| Response facilitation
According to Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, and Cohen (2005) P3 reflects response facilitation after decisions on relevant signals have been reached.
Oddball effect: It may be added to that definition that signals should not only be relevant, but also infrequent (as was highlighted by Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005 , when describing locus coeruleus activities but was not further mentioned in their assumptions about the psychological function of those activities). It is not really clear what the function of this response facilitation is supposed to be because, after all, behavioral responses in the oddball task are much slower with rare stimuli (where large, "response-facilitating" P3b components occur) than with frequent stimuli, by about 100 ms (e.g., about 400 ms vs. about 300 ms in Śmigasiewicz, 2016, and Verleger et al., 2016a) . This appears opposite to response facilitation, yielding a "−" entry in the oddball column of Table 1. In the following, it will be nevertheless assumed that there is some mechanism of the oddball effect that is compatible with the hypothesis. Otherwise, the following "+" entries in four of the five columns will have to be changed.
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: Since all that counts is facilitation of the rare response, the hypothesis can account for the similarity of effects between single-stimulus and oddball tasks ("+").
R-defined S categories: Again, since all that counts is facilitation of the rare response, the hypothesis can account for the similarity of effects between two-stimulus and multi-stimulus oddball tasks ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: The response-facilitation hypothesis does not provide means to account for these effects ("0").
Hit frequency: In contrast, this effect is easy to describe with the concept of facilitation of the rare response ("+").
Relevance: By definition, this hypothesis can account for the effect of relevance on the oddball effect ("+").
| Decision
More recently, evidence has been provided that P3b might directly reflect the decision process rather than some postdecision adaptation, with the time-course of the P3b waveforms reflecting the time-course of the diffusion process that drives the decision (Kelly & O'Connell, 2013; O'Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2015) .
Oddball effect: The oddball effect is explained by the diffusion model through the asymmetry of thresholds for frequent and rare decisions relative to the starting point of the diffusion process (Twomey et al., 2015: "+" in Table 1) .
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: It is not clear why P3b amplitudes are not drastically smaller in single-stimulus than in oddball tasks: There is hardly any decision required in the single-stimulus task except that noting that something had occurred ("0").
R-defined S categories: Like the post-decision response-facilitation hypothesis (Section 5.6), the decision hypothesis may account for the similarity of effects between two-stimulus and multi-stimulus oddball tasks because all that counts is the relative frequency of the decision for the rare alternative ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: These effects pose some challenge to the hypothesis: What are the decisions reflected by P3b in this task? These might be the decisions "yes, I was right" and "no, I was wrong." But why does the decision wrong produce a larger P3 than the decision correct with frequent stimuli and vice versa with rare stimuli? It appears that the model has to be further specified to deal with this situation ("0" in third column).
Hit frequency: Like with R-defined S categories, the decision hypotheses can account for this effect because it assumes that P3b is determined by the relative frequency of the decision for the rare alternative ("+").
Relevance: The effect of relevance on the oddball effect is easily explained because when there is no decision there will be no P3b ("+").
| Reactivation of S-R links
Likewise recently, the present author proposed the hypothesis of S-R link reactivation (e.g., Verleger, Baur, et al., 2014; Verleger et al., 2016a; . This hypothesis takes as its premise that a few fixed S-R links are established by instruction and, if necessary, by practice (e.g., "stimulus A → left key," "stimulus B → right key").
Oddball effect: Given this premise, the hypothesis assumes that P3b reflects reactivation of such links triggered by perception of the respective stimulus. S-R links will need more reactivation, reflected by increased P3b amplitudes, when not having been used in the preceding trials, that is, with rare stimuli ("+" entry in Table 1 ).
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: The similarity between single-stimulus and oddball tasks may be explained by the identical frequency of the rare S-R events in both tasks ("+").
R-defined S categories: P3b amplitudes in oddball tasks are determined by infrequency of responses rather than of stimuli, because S-R links are established according to instruction as links between categories and their responses ("female names → left key"). Thereby, with any stimulus, first the correct category has to be invoked, which accounts for the latency delay of P3b reported by Kutas et al. (1977) in this multi-stimulus task relative to the two-stimulus task, while the need for response activation to this category remains the same as with single stimuli of the same frequency ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: The S-R link hypothesis can principally account for the occurrence of P3 in prediction tasks, even though no overt explicit response may be required to the predicted stimuli, by assuming that these stimuli elicit the internal responses "match"/"mismatch" (between stimulus and preceding prediction) and that it is the frequency of these S-R events that counts (stimulus A → match, stimulus A → mismatch, stimulus B → match, stimulus B → mismatch; Verleger, Cäsar, et al., 2017) ("+").
Hit frequency: Again, it is simply the frequency of S-R events that counts ("+").
Relevance: The hypothesis is based on the very assumption that it needs response requirements to elicit a P3b ("+").
| Producing conscious representations
P3b has been suggested to reflect activation of some global workspace in producing consciousness (Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003) , which implies that P3b should be either present or absent in any trial because conscious awareness is considered to be an all-or-none phenomenon rather than a gradual one (Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005) .
Oddball effect: Accordingly, the oddball effect constitutes a major problem for this hypothesis: There can be no reasonable doubt that the frequent non-target stimuli in the oddball task are consciously perceived. Nevertheless the P3 component elicited by those stimuli is negligible ("−" in Table 1) .
Temporal rather than stimulus infrequency: Since target stimuli are clearly perceptible in both tasks, this hypothesis successfully predicts that target-evoked P3b is as large in the single-stimulus task as in the oddball task ("+").
R-defined S categories: The same argument applies to target-evoked P3b in multiple-stimuli versus two-stimuli tasks ("+").
Outcome infrequency in prediction tasks: The hypothesis does not have any means to predict the large differences in P3 amplitudes between rare and frequent outcomes in the prediction task. Rather, the hypothesis expects P3 amplitudes to have the same size whenever the predicted stimuli are consciously perceived ("−").
Hit frequency: The consciousness hypothesis predicts that P3b amplitudes will reflect observers' sensitivity to the signal. This is in blatant contrast to Paul and Sutton's (1972) | 17 of 22 VERLEGER demonstration that P3 covaries with observers' response bias ("−"). (Admittedly, this is not uncontroversial, for example, Salti, Bar-Haim, & Lamy, 2012) .
Relevance: Stimuli that are consciously perceived should elicit P3b components no matter whether a task is or is not involved. Thus, the hypothesis cannot account for modification of P3b by relevance ("−").
Undoubtedly this is the most fascinating of all hypotheses about P3b. At the same time, out of all hypotheses it provides the worst explanation of the results compiled in Table 1 . The "+" entries in column 1 and 2 were possible because the result to be explained in both columns was the absence of any effect. This fits the hypothesis because it does not predict any difference between any two consciously perceived stimuli. As soon as, there are experimental effects on P3b producing differences between two conditions, the hypothesis fails.
| DISCUSSION
This article reviewed classic effects of stimulus frequency and relevance on P3b amplitude, highlighting the possibility that these effects may be described in terms of connecting stimuli to their responses. Constructs and hypotheses about P3b were evaluated with regard to their power to account for those effects and, additionally, with regard to their power to account for the oddball effect. S-R link reactivation hypothesis could account for all six selected results, followed by closure hypothesis (five out of the six results).
The six "benchmark" results turned out to be differentially selective in their discriminatory power. At the one extreme, the relevance effect (fifth column of Table 1) yielded a "+" result in 10 out of 12 rows. Therefore, one might argue that this item should not have been included. Yet, it seems plausible to state that any hypothesis about P3b should be able to account for the effect of relevance: Not being able to do so appears as a decisive criterion against any hypothesis. This actually applies to the conscious-representation and the priming hypotheses.
Likewise, constructs and hypotheses should at least be able to account for the oddball effect, quite independently of any relation to response processing. To this end, the rightmost column was added to Table 1 . It is quite instructive to see the variety of concepts used by the different hypotheses for describing this effect. And it is astonishing to see that several of the listed hypotheses do not offer a clear and consistent account of this most basic effect. The reasons leading to the downgraded scores have been provided in Section 5. This problem applies massively ("−" in sixth column) to the consciousness-representation and response-facilitation hypotheses, and in milder extent ("0" in sixth column) to the context-updating hypothesis. This evaluation of the context-updating hypothesis might read most astonishing of all evaluations given here but, as noted in Section 5.4, speaking of a "model of the environment" does not make sense when this model is not even able to learn the fact that two stimuli occur with different probabilities but rather needs updating again and again when rare stimuli are encountered.
Of the other four compiled effects (first four columns of Table 1) the prediction-task effect (third column) appears most difficult to evaluate, being composed of three single results: Rare stimuli elicit larger P3s than frequent stimuli, P3s elicited by frequent stimuli are larger after the incorrect rare prediction than after the correct frequent prediction, and P3s elicited by rare stimuli are larger after the correct rare prediction than after the incorrect frequent prediction. All "+" scores were obtained by constructs and hypotheses (expectancy, priming, cognitive processing, memory storage, context updating, S-R link reactivation) that are unspecified enough to integrate this pattern of results, but it might actually have been any other pattern, possibly except for priming and S-R link reactivation where the moderating effects could be specified to some extent. On the other side of the spectrum, the consciousness hypothesis completely fails to provide an account for this variation while the other hypotheses encounter different kinds of problems (yielding a "0" score): The closure hypothesis would need a complex system of embedded epochs (suggested by Verleger, 1988) reminding of Ptolemaic epicycles to account even for the most basic result in this three-result package (rare > frequent). Somewhat in contrast, the response facilitation and decision hypotheses simply do not offer any conceptual tool to deal with these results (yielding "0" scores, too). In case of the decision hypothesis, this might be due to the lacking application of the hypothesis to prediction tasks so far.
A problem for evaluating the hypotheses with respect to the difference of P3b amplitudes between the single-stimulus task and the oddball task (first column) is the variability of results: Some studies found larger amplitudes in the oddball task, one study reported a condition with smaller amplitudes in the oddball task, and most studies did not obtain reliable differences, so the difference was here treated as not really existing. This was to the disadvantage of some constructs and hypotheses that predict higher amplitudes in the oddball task: Capacity, cognitive processing, memory storage, and context updating. Correspondingly, this was to the advantage of other hypotheses that do not predict a difference between single-stimulus and oddball tasks: Closure, response facilitation, S-R link reactivation, and conscious representation. If evidence is assessed differently, taking the weak difference between the two tasks as representing the real result, memory storage would draw level with S-R link reactivation, both having five out of six possible "+" scores.
To summarize, there is no unchallenged best hypothesis on P3b and there are still several promising approaches. On the one hand, this is unsatisfactory but, on the other hand, this is apt to stimulate research. Most welcome will be studies where different hypotheses will be tested against each other.
